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Introduction 
The discovery of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network has sparked inquiry into the roles of 
clandestine transactions in the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their 
delivery systems.[1] Although the scale of Khan’s operation is perhaps greater than that of 
previous networks, such networks (clandestine or not) are hardly new or unique. However, in 
order to begin to answer these questions, the mechanisms that guide the formation and 
dissolution of networks must be better understood.[2]  
Is the A.Q. Khan network unique among clandestine proliferation networks? How easily can it be 
fragmented, taken apart, and shut down? Will it regenerate or be reproduced by parallel networks? 
Despite the impressive scale of Khan’s operation, its structure as a proliferation network is not 
unique. Very little has been written about why proliferation networks look the way they do. Like 
the demand-side question of why states seek weapons, the supply-side question of where states 
try to get needed materials from is significantly affected by efforts of powerful actors to limit 
access to nuclear technologies. Assessing these efforts, however, requires some knowledge of 
the structure of proliferation networks. Without taking this into account, efforts to limit network 
structures can be useless, or even counterproductive, if shutting down one supplier only results in 
others taking its place. This article incorporates theories from transaction-cost economics and 
network analysis to explain the general structure of proliferation transactions as markets, 
networks, or hierarchies. It also explores theories as to why particular network ties are formed—
whether due to similar structural positions, similarity of attributes, or pre-existing ties. After looking 
at a few proliferation structures to see which mechanisms seem to dominate transactions, it 
concludes by briefly outlining some policy implications. 
Markets, Networks, and Hierarchies 
Economists and sociologists have identified three basic structures through which transactions 
occur: markets, networks, and hierarchies.[3] In a market model of transactions, goods are 
exchanged between actors who have no past and no future connections. Each transaction is 
autonomous, and communication occurs through price. In the hierarchical model, a single actor 
determines what transactions occur with subordinate actors. Transactions are determined 
through power. In a network model, transactions occur between actors that have a longer-term, 
repeated relationship. Reciprocity norms and reputation concerns help to govern transactions.  
Suppose that you’d like a cup of coffee. In a market, each time that you desire a cup, you 
determine which of several suppliers has the lowest price with the quality of product you desire. 
You buy it there. In a hierarchy, you go out and buy a coffee maker and make it yourself instead 
of outsourcing coffee production to an external supplier. In a network, you develop a relationship 
with a particular coffee place over time. A barista may have particular knowledge of the type of 
coffee that you like or may know a method of making coffee that is superior to that at other places. 
In proliferation networks, the question is whether a particular part or system is bought on a market, 
through a relationship with a particular supplier or set of suppliers, or whether a proliferator 
chooses to produce parts or systems in-house.  
All three structures are actually networks. In Figure 1, A has demand for a product that may be 
supplied by B and/or C. In a market network, transactions between two or more nodes are 
asymmetrical. There is no stable connection between different actors over time, so A may 
transact with B one time and with C another. In the more stable, hierarchical models, a superior A 
orders inferior(s) B and/or C to produce the product. In a network transaction, there is a more 
symmetrical and stable relationship among actors. A not only exchanges products with B and C, 
but also forms a relationship with each that is repeated over time. In a network, relationships may 
also grow and increase over time between previously disconnected agents, e.g., B and C.[4] 
Figure 1: Market, Network, and Hierarchy Relationships 
 
Market transactions are asymmetrical and change over time. Network transactions are more 
symmetrical and are repeated. Hierarchical transactions are top-down and stable.  
Transaction-cost economics first distinguished the conditions under which markets and 
hierarchies were likely to form. Market-type transactions occur when transaction costs are low, 
exchanges are straightforward, knowledge is symmetrical, and repetition is unnecessary. 
Hierarchies arise when opportunism is high and rationality is bounded such that contracting for all 
contingencies is difficult.[5] The network form of transaction was subsequently identified by other 
scholars as a distinct category (as opposed to a mixing of ideal types) that relies upon reciprocity 
and collaboration to govern transactions. This form is particularly well suited to the transmission 
of knowledge. Knowledge is less constrained in a network than it is in a market or hierarchy. 
Market incentives treat knowledge as a commodity to be sold rather than given, while hierarchies 
constrain the conduits through which knowledge might pass.[6] Knowing which of these forms—
or what combination of these forms—proliferation networks are likely to take is crucial in 
evaluating efforts to stop them.  
The question remains, however, as to why relations form between some potential partners in a 
network and not others. Unfortunately, scholars have not elucidated particular conditions under 
which network transactions will take place instead of hierarchies or markets or why particular 
network ties are favored within repeated relational transactions. Network analysis does specify 
some general mechanisms through which new ties are likely to be created. These generally fall 
into one of two categories: relational mechanisms or individual mechanisms. Relational 
mechanisms specify how the relative locations of two actors within existing networks influence the 
likelihood of ties occurring, while individual mechanisms specify how particular attributes of 
individual actors make pairs of actors more or less likely to form ties.  
Two of the most prominent positional mechanisms in network analysis are structural balance and 
structural equivalence. Structural balance hypothesizes that between three actors, only certain 
patterns of positive (affect) and negative (enmity) ties can exist.[7] Specifically, given any three 
actors, positive or negative ties between the three must be conserved. Essentially, the friend of 
my friend is my friend, and the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Figure 2 demonstrates three 
triads. In the left and middle triads, no role strain exists, since all relations are compatible. The 
right triad is unbalanced. Role strain will occur, and over the longer term such a triad is unlikely to 
be found. 
Figure 2: Balanced and Unbalanced Triads 
 
The left and center triads are balanced due to transitivity. The right one violates transitivity—if A 
likes B, and A likes C, then B should like C, etc—and is unbalanced. 
Structural equivalence hypothesizes that actors in similar structural positions vis-a-vis each other 
will act in similar ways. In particular, they may be more likely to form ties, although in some 
circumstances, they may compete if there is conflict over scarce resources. Two actors are 
structurally equivalent if they share the same ties with the same actors.[8] In the middle network 
pictured in Figure 1, B and C are structurally equivalent and form a connection over time. 
Structural equivalence is a slight misnomer, since it measures equivalence with respect to 
particular actors rather than referring to the type of relationship.[9]  
Since exact equivalence is rare in social data, positional analysis attempts to identify actors who 
are structurally similar. By virtue of their positions and similar structural pressures to conform to 
particular roles, these actors are likely to act in similar ways. To take a specific role as an 
example, students are likely to act in similar ways, whereas students and teachers, by virtue of 
their different positions, act differently. In particular, students are more likely to form ties between 
each other rather than with the teacher. Because of their similar positions, they are likely to see 
each other as members of the same group. In-group favoritism is a well-established phenomenon 
in social psychological studies.[10] Such groups can also become subdivided into smaller ones. 
Identifying salient groups requires in-depth knowledge of the groups in question.  
Individual mechanisms tend to be related to the broad notion of homophily,[11] or the tendency of 
actors who are similar in certain ways to form ties based on their common attributes. So states 
with similar attributes—common ideology, for example—may be more likely to form ties with each 
other. The same attributes that bring them together, however, may also promote competition in 
certain cases. On the other hand, states with complementary attributes may be more likely to 
form ties with each other.  
Finally, the types of pre-existing network connections also affect the creation of new network ties. 
States that already have extensive ties are more likely to be linked in proliferation networks, 
especially if these ties are military and/or clandestine in nature. 
Network Structures 
Networks can take on a variety of structures. The efficacy of policies for limiting the supply of 
nuclear technologies against a given node in a network, or for the network as a whole, depends 
on the overall structure of the network. While analysis of supply networks is ultimately a function 
of all ties within that network, three archetypes can be loosely defined.  
Networks can be structured: as rings or circles in which the connections between nodes form a 
circle; as a star in which every node is connected through a central hub; or as a clique, a much 
denser network in which each node is directly connected to every other node. See Figure 3. The 
figure also illustrates the vulnerability of each type of network, determined, in part, by the number 
of cutpoints or cutsets it contains. A cutpoint is a node without which the network would break into 
one or more pieces.[12] A cutset is a set of nodes in a network that similarly is vital to the network. 
Therefore, a ring is a network in which each node is directly connected to only two neighbors. The 
network is connected and has no cutpoint. However, any two non-neighboring points constitute a 
cutset, so a ring is still somewhat vulnerable. A star is a network that has a single cutpoint that 
isolates all nodes. It is, however, robust to attacks on nodes other than the central hub. An n-
clique (in Figure 3, a 1-clique) is a network or sub-network in which every node is connected to 
every other node through n ties. It is the most vulnerable to attacks.[13] 
Figure 3: Simple Network Structures  
 
Simple network structures.  
Figure 3 shows that if the structure is a ring or a clique, then there is no single node (state) that 
could be shut down to unravel the entire network; consequently, actions against single nodes are 
likely to be ineffective. Actions against more than one node, however, can isolate parts of the 
circle network. For a clique, global options—i.e. those that affect all nodes—might seem best. 
Densely connected, clique-like networks are highly decentralized—no single state holds a crucial 
position in the network. In one sense, decentralized networks are easier to shut down in that 
connections to additional nodes in the network are easier to discover. On the other hand, a star 
network—i.e. a hub-and-spoke pattern—is highly centralized, and efforts are best concentrated 
on eliminating the central node and preventing other nodes from becoming hubs. 
Knowledge and Networks 
Networks may be limited by other factors, such as availability of particular technologies and 
whether they require special knowledge in order to build and/or operate them. Such factors also 
affect the structure of transactions. Both production of fissile materials and the design and 
construction of nuclear weapons require a great deal of tacit knowledge.  
Tacit or “shop-floor” knowledge is that which cannot be formulated in words or symbols, but must 
be learned through trial-and-error processes. Bicycle riding is a well-known example of tacit 
knowledge. It is impossible to learn how to ride a bicycle simply by reading an instruction manual. 
Nuclear weapons design and production are both heavily dependent on tacit knowledge. Even if a 
state possesses a bomb design, many additional steps are required for both fissile materials 
production and weapons design in order to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal. Both Britain and 
the Soviet Union began by attempting to replicate a U.S. design that they possessed, yet both 
had to undertake major efforts in order to effectively produce their arsenals. Every subsequent 
nuclear program has taken longer than the original Manhattan project to build an initial nuclear 
weapon, despite transfer of information and even scientists from one program to another.[14] 
After the initial step of building an implosion weapon, however, some states have been quicker to 
develop two-stage weapons. One of the major preoccupations of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
complex is attempting to retain such knowledge in the absence of testing.[15] Ballistic missile 
development–while also requiring tacit knowledge—seems to be less restricted because missile 
design and testing are more easily divided into discrete elements.[16]  
What is it about a nuclear weapon that requires tacit knowledge? Being able to cast the weapon’s 
fissile materials and high explosives into the proper shapes is a difficult task that requires direct 
experience that cannot be simply extrapolated from other industrial processes.[17] Siegfried S. 
Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, noted that, “The real secrets are 
in the details of the metallurgy, the manufacturing and the engineering.”[18] Tacit knowledge 
consequently plays a major role in structuring proliferation transactions. The high knowledge 
requirement of nuclear weapons production makes transactions more likely to be hierarchies 
rather than networks, and networks rather than markets. Nuclear weapons projects operated as 
hierarchies, however, are likely to be more costly. Acquisition of the requisite knowledge requires 
extensive internal research and development. The Manhattan project, for example, cost $21 
billion in 1996 dollars,[19] or about $5 billion per weapon initially produced. It employed tens of 
thousands of engineers as well as scientists. In short, a nuclear weapons program is not only a 
technical feat, but also an organizational one. 
Proliferation Networks in Practice 
Nuclear proliferation transactions between states—whether intentional or not—are as old as 
nuclear weapons. British scientists from the Manhattan project carried knowledge about nuclear 
technology back to the United Kingdom, while Soviet spies managed to extract documentation of 
U.S. efforts. Full-blown networks, in which transactions occur among more than two isolated 
participants, are a more recent development. Many transactions are clandestine, and so any 
diagrams describing the structure of these networks are necessarily uncertain and potentially 
incomplete.  
The best-documented proliferation networks involve the transfer of ballistic missile technology 
and are summarized in Figures 4 and 5. Missile proliferation data in these figures comes from the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative and extends through 2002.[20] Unique and/or minor incidents were 
discarded. Year ranges do not indicate constant assistance, but rather the first and last years 
during which known transactions occurred. Ranges ending in 2000 or later may represent 
ongoing relationships, while ranges that end before 2000 more likely indicate terminated 
relationships.  
The first-tier missile proliferation network is pictured in Figure 4. It does not include all known 
transactions—and, of course, cannot include unknown ones. However, it is clear that first-tier 
proliferation has been dominated by Russia and China, each having shared technology with four 
states—North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Additionally, Russia has assisted Egypt and Libya, 
while China has assisted Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. First-tier missile technology transactions are 
market-like. There are multiple suppliers, transactions are one-way, and reciprocal knowledge-
sharing or trading does not occur. The structure of transactions resembles a star network with two 
hubs. Transactions with the four states that purchased missile technology from both China and 
Russia do not shed any light on why particular ties formed beyond market mechanisms. On the 
other hand, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Libya, acquired technology from only one 
of the two hubs, likely due to existing security ties. In the case of China and Pakistan, both faced 
a similar threat: India. The ties between Russia and Egypt and Russia and Libya may have more 
to do with broader Cold War strategies. The China–Saudi Arabia connection is harder to explain. 
And, China may have also provided assistance to Libya, as well.  
Figure 4: Network Structure of First-Tier Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
 
Nodes are placed for clarity. Minor nodes are excluded. 
Since joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995, Russia has decreased its 
proliferation of missile technology—although it is still suspected of assisting North Korea and Iran, 
albeit at a lower level. China likewise has agreed to abide by the MTCR. In 2000, it pledged not to 
assist in the development of nuclear-capable missiles and issued related regulations in 2002. 
However, it was still assisting Pakistan and Iran at that point.[21]  
The second-tier ballistic missile proliferation network is depicted in Figure 5. Only the core, 
second-tier proliferators are in this diagram. Other countries that received only limited 
assistance—e.g., Yemen, Sudan—are excluded. All members of this network are also members 
of the first-tier network. Unlike the first-tier transactions, these transactions resemble a clique 
structure, and relationships are more reciprocal. However, with the exception of Iran and North 
Korea, no two proliferators are connected to each other through missile trades. North Korea 
forms the center of this missile proliferation network, delivering missile technology to Egypt, Iraq, 
Libya, Syria, Pakistan, and Iran, among others. Iran forms a smaller hub for missile sales, linking 
North Korea, Syria, and Libya. Unlike the first-tier, formation of these networks seems to uphold 
transitivity and structural equivalence; where relationships have lasted for a significant period of 
time between one of the earlier hubs (China or Russia), new ties have formed. Three of the four 
core missile proliferators who received technology from both China and Russia later developed 
links between each other (Syria, Iran, and North Korea), although the Syria–Iran link developed 
before they were connected through Russia.  
Figure 5: Network Structure of Second-Tier Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
 
Uncertain dates are marked as ~ (middle of decade), < (beginning of decade), or > (end of 
decade). Nodes are placed for clarity. Minor nodes are excluded.  
The second-tier missile proliferation network shown in Figure 5 also exhibits a much more 
dynamic, network-like structure than the first-tier network. North Korea received early assistance 
from Egypt (1974-1981) and Iran (1988) before returning the favor by assisting both with their 
later developments of ballistic missiles. Libya and Syria assisted Iran early in its program, which 
was subsequently reciprocated. Some of these relationships represent single transactions (like 
the Iranian transfer of wrecked Iraqi missiles to North Korea in 1988), while others are more 
reciprocal and more stable.  
Nuclear proliferation data from the A.Q. Khan network are pictured in Figure 6. Pakistan is the 
hub, or central node, for this network. A.Q. Khan used the clandestine network to supply 
Pakistan’s program, creating a clearinghouse for delivery of parts from private actors to Iran, 
Libya, and North Korea. It also offered parts to other countries, such as Iraq and possibly Syria.  
Figure 6: Network Structure of Second-Tier Nuclear Proliferation Rings. 
 Declined offers of assistance are dotted; uncertain dates are marked as ~ (mid-decade). Nodes 
are placed for clarity. Minor nodes are excluded. 
All four of the missile technology proliferators who received aid from both China and Russia (plus 
Libya, which may have also received assistance from both), were either approached by or 
received assistance from the A.Q. Khan network. In some ways, the network is an odd hybrid of 
transactions. Since the knowledge requirements for the production of nuclear weapons are higher 
than ballistic missiles, the number of suppliers is more limited, and transactions are more 
hierarchical. Knowledge requirements also restrict the ties that might otherwise be created due to 
structural pressures. Without access to the requisite knowledge, ties cannot be formed.  
Missile technology thus appears to be more transferable than nuclear technology. Many of the 
relationships in Figure 5 involve reciprocal exchanges. This, in part, may be due to the many 
small technical challenges posed by ballistic missiles that allow for more decentralization and 
specialization than nuclear weapons technology.[23] Because of the density of ties among the 
participating nodes, such networks are much more difficult to shut down. 
Conclusion 
Why might nuclear proliferation networks initially look like stars, rather than rings or cliques, and 
how might they evolve? I argue that the tacit knowledge required to successfully build nuclear 
weapons results in nuclear proliferation networks that are more likely to adopt star structures. 
Missile networks are more likely to become cliques much faster. This constraint structures the 
proliferation networks. In a clique, only the central hub can dispatch experts to (attempt to) train 
new proliferators. But, the satellite states can help each other with acquiring equipment, but not 
tacit knowledge. While tacit knowledge always requires some trial-and-error experience, tutelage 
by someone who has already possesses the knowledge can speed up the process. A.Q. Khan 
delivered parts and plans to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, but nonetheless all of these countries 
have had difficulties producing nuclear materials. Indeed, this seems to have been North Korea's 
problem: “One official said that some information suggests the DPRK may have ‘slavishly 
followed a recipe’ calling for some more advanced components or materials, as called for in the 
design package provided by its helpers.”[24] While Iran appears not to have followed the same 
route, the numerous problems it encountered in its program indicate that Pakistan was unable to 
transfer tacit knowledge easily.[25] This also seems to have been the case for Libya. These 
similar lags in time seem to indicate that they experienced the same tacit knowledge problems 
that other states have encountered. They bought “nuclear technology without actually knowing 
how it worked.”[26] As a result, it appears that the damage done by A.Q. Khan’s network may be 
much less severe than initial reports implied.  
Market incentives may restrict future nuclear proliferation networks. Hub states might have 
incentives to restrict information transfer. For example, they might sell parts for centrifuges, but 
not the instructions on how to create them in order to maintaining profits. Unfortunately, due to 
structural equivalence and transitivity, the individual satellite nodes are likely to form ties (nuclear 
or not) with each other due to their common connections with the hub, thus decreasing chance of 
a potential dismantlement of the network by eliminating the hub. Knowledge restrictions mean 
that missile transactions will tend more towards markets (like the first-tier missile proliferation 
network) and networks (like the second-tier missile proliferation network), while nuclear 
transactions will continue to be more hierarchical.  
Since a star network can be shut down by eliminating the central node, it implies a policy of 
targeting the central node and discouraging satellite nodes from producing new connections by 
separating them. If “rogue states” are stopped from connecting with the rest of the world, they will 
be more likely to connect with each other—with potentially disastrous consequences.  
While nuclear and missile proliferation networks contain very similar participants, the dynamics of 
these networks appear to be very different. Knowledge requirements seem to be a major reason 
for this difference, although they don’t entirely determine structure, at least in the case of missile 
proliferation. Transactions in the first-tier network were market-like; structural equivalence or 
homophily didn’t determine relations. Rather, strategic relationships and market pricing played a 
larger role, with two main suppliers selling technology to many different participants. These 
networks were star-shaped with central hubs; pressure exerted on Russia and China has thus 
been the best way to tackle these networks.  
However, this market laid the groundwork for a more network-like structure in the second-tier 
proliferators, in which structurally equivalent actors from the first network formed ties and 
reciprocally developed missile programs. States that had connections to Russia and China over 
time formed an additional network which was more reciprocal and decentralized. Focusing on a 
small number of current or potential hubs may be the best way of stopping them. On the other 
hand, given the widespread diffusion of knowledge, efforts that address the entire network may 
be most efficient.  
The nuclear network—in which knowledge played a larger role—incorporate a different set of 
actors than the missile network. Nuclear transactions have been more hierarchical, with a single 
supplier attempting a one-way transfer of knowledge. This network was star-shaped, similar to 
the first-tier missile proliferation networks. Stopping the hub of the nuclear network would seem to 
be the best policy. Efforts, therefore, should focus on bringing Pakistan into the nuclear supply 
regime and on minimizing the chances that North Korea or Iran could become new nuclear hubs. 
This may involve difficult tradeoffs, such as agreeing that these states can retain a civilian nuclear 
infrastructure in exchange for agreed limits on dissemination of the sensitive nuclear technologies 
involved with the front or back of the fuel cycle. While this may increase the threat that these 
countries will build and test nuclear weapons, stopping the spread of the knowledge required to 
create weapons is worth it. 
About the Author 
Alexander Montgomery is a joint International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project 
Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School 
of Government at Harvard University and a Political Science PhD candidate at Stanford 
University. For the 2005-6 academic year, he will be a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for 
International Security and Cooperation in the Stanford Institute for International Studies at 
Stanford University. He has a BA in Physics from the University of Chicago, an MA in Energy and 
Resources from the University of California, Berkeley, and an MA in Sociology from Stanford 
University.  
He has worked as a research associate in high-energy physics on the BaBar experiment at 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and as a graduate research assistant at the Center for 
International Security Affairs at Los Alamos National Laboratory. His research interests include 
political organizations, weapons of mass disruption and destruction, social studies of technology, 
and interstate social relations. His dissertation asks the question, "What US post-Cold War 
counterproliferation strategies towards potential nuclear states have been successful and why?"  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email ccc@nps.edu 
with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other 
purpose. 
References 
1. For an overview of proliferation rings, see Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation 
Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security 29, no. 2 
(Fall 2004), 5-49. On dismantling nuclear networks, see Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing in 
Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 
2005), 153-187. 
2. This article was originally prepared for “Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks: 
Challenges to U.S. Security,” conference sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 
Naval Postgraduate School, June 29–July 1, 2005.  
3. The increasing popularity of open-source publishing has spawned claims that a fourth model, 
the “bazaar,” is emerging, although it seems unlikely to affect nuclear weapons programs. Benoit 
Demil and Xavier Lecocq, “Neither Market Nor Hierarchy Or Network: The Emerging Bazaar 
Governance,” 2005. 
4. Walter W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Research in 
Organizational Behavior 12 (1990), 295-336; see also Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, 
“Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review Of Sociology 24 (1998), 57-76. 
5. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (New York: Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1985). 
6. Powell, Op. Cit.; see also Podolny and Page, Op. Cit. 
7. For a technical discussion of structural balance and transitivity, see Stanley Wasserman and 
Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
8. Ibid. For a technical discussion of structural equivalence and the origins of the current usage of 
the term, see Ronald S. Burt, “Positions in Networks,” Social Forces 55, no. 1 (1976), 93-122. For 
a good overview, see John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, 2nd ed. (Thousands 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2000). 
9. On distinctions between different types of structural similarity, see Stephen Borgatti and Martin 
Everett, “Notions of Position in Social Network Analysis,” Sociological Methodology 22 (1992), 1-
35. 
10. John M. Levine and Richard L. Moreland, “Small Groups,” in Daniel Todd Gilbert, Susan T. 
Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 
1998), 415-469. 
11. On homophily, see Howard Francis Taylor, Balance in Small Groups (New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970); see also Jere M. Cohen, “Sources of Peer Group Homogeneity,” 
Sociology of Education 50, no. 4 (1977), 227-241; and Denise B. Kandel, “Homophily, Selection, 
and Socialization in Adolescent Friendships,” American Journal of Sociology 84, no. 2 (1978), 
427-436. 
12. On cutpoints, see Wasserman and Faust, “Social Network Analysis,” 112-113.  
13. Ibid., Chapter 4. 
14. Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the 
Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons,” American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1 (July 1995), 44-99. 
15. Alexander H. Montgomery,"“Reconstructing Reliability: Confidence in Nuclear Weapons 
under Science Based Stockpile Stewardship,” masters thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 
May 1999. 
16. See Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile 
Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). 
17. MacKenzie and Spinardi, Op. Cit. 
18. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Pakistani ’s Black Market May Sell Nuclear Secrets,” 
New York Times, March 21, 2005. 
19. Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). 
20. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles, January 8, 2005. 
21. On Chinese and Russian missile exports and dates, see their respective entries in the NTI 
database. 
22. Data are mainly from Gaurav Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan 
(Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
February 23, 2004). Suspected contacts with Saudi Arabia and the UAE are excluded. Meetings 
between A.Q. Khan and Iranian ministers may have begun as early as 1986 or 1987. See also 
Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, 
August 1992 (Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992); Herbert Krosney, Deadly Business: Legal Deals 
and Outlaw Weapons: The Arming of Iran and Iraq, 1975 to the Present (London: Four Walls 
Eight Windows, 1993); and Dafna Linzer, “Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts: Secret Meeting in 
1987 May Have Begun Program,” Washington Post, February 27, 2005. 
23. I thank Dean Wilkening for pointing this out. 
24. Mark Hibbs, “CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive outside Help on Centrifuges,” 
Nuclear Fuel 27, no. 24 (November 25 2002), 1. 
25. For the problems that North Korea, Libya, and Iran faced, see Montgomery, Op. Cit.  
26. David Crawford, “Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb; Program Was Haphazard, But 
Shows How Technology Was Bought Off-the-Shelf,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2004.  
CCC Home Naval Postgraduate School  
 
